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I. INTRODUCTION
As early as 1923, the United States Supreme Court held that a
parent's right to make decisions concerning the upbringing of their
children is a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.' A state is
not to inject itself into the private realm of family to question the abil-
ity of a parent to make decisions concerning the rearing of their chil-
dren so long as the parent is fit and adequately responsible to provide
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Katherine S. Vogel, B.S. 2005, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D. expected
2008, University of Nebraska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW). I wish to
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acting as a sounding board for my ideas; my mother, Cindy Drake for giving me
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survived law school.
1. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that fundamental parental
rights prevent the state from denying children access to foreign language instruc-
tion despite the demands of their parents).
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for the care of their children. 2 However, if a parent is unable to take
care of their child, the state has an obligation to remove that child.
3
In the 2006 case, In re Phoenix, Sonya, a mother of three children, had
her parental rights terminated after it was shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence that her continued custody would result in harm to
the children. 4 On appeal, the mother challenged the termination as a
violation of her Equal Protection rights. As the mother of non-Indian
children, her parental rights could be terminated by a showing of clear
and convincing evidence 5 while the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare
Act ("NICWA" or "Act") requires a showing of evidence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt before the rights of a parent of an Indian child can be
terminated.6 Sonya claimed that the differing standards of proof were
based upon an impermissible racial classification in violation of both
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Ne-
braska Constitution.7
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that there was no equal protec-
tion claim since the classification of "Indian" was a political classifica-
tion, not a racial one, based upon the historic sovereignty of Indian
tribes.8 While the Nebraska Supreme Court was correct in following a
long line of historic precedent upholding legislation which singled out
Indians for special treatment under the law, the Court only addressed
how the NICWA impacts parents of non-Indian children in its analy-
sis. The other side of the issue is how the NICWA impacts the consti-
tutional rights of parents of Indian children.
This Note focuses on how the statutory provisions of the NICWA
potentially infringe upon the rights of Indian children's parents. Spe-
cifically, this Note explores where parental rights currently stand in
America's jurisprudence and how a potential substantive due process
claim by the parent of an Indian child may be analyzed by a Nebraska
court. Part II of the Note discusses the legal and historical back-
ground of the federal and Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act and of-
fers and an explanation of the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in
Phoenix. Part III is an analysis of how the rights of parents of Indian
children differ from that of parents of non-Indian children when it
comes to voluntarily placing their child up for adoption and why the
restrictions on the rights of parents of Indian children violates the
Due Process Clause. Part III also discusses how a Nebraska court
may analyze a due process claim brought by the parents of an Indian
2. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (Reissue 2005).
3. Id.
4. 270 Neb. 870, 708 N.W.2d 786 (2006).
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-279.01(3) (Reissue 2005).
6. Id. § 43-1505(6).
7. Phoenix, 270 Neb. at 875, 708 N.W.2d at 792.
8. Id. at 882, 708 N.W.2d at 797.
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child by looking at whether there is a due process right to be pro-
tected, what level of protection the parental right should receive, and
what countervailing interests the State may have in upholding the
NICWA. While this Note does not provide a definitive conclusion to
the parental rights issues outline, hopefully the Note will encourage
readers to consider the ramifications of the NICWA and will show the
NICWA is actually harming those it was, in part, designed to help.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Indian Child Welfare Act
The Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA" or "the Act")9 was enacted
on the federal level in 1978 in response to tribal outcry concerning the
high rate of removal of Indian children from their homes and tribes.
The separation of Indian children from their families started in the
1800s when Indian children were placed in boarding schools run by
whites in an effort to assimilate them into mainstream white soci-
ety.10 Tribes claim that this "assimilation" policy was sustained
through the 1960s and 1970s, when, prior to the passage of the ICWA,
twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children were separated
from their families and placed into foster care or adoptive homes
through state court proceedings. 1 ' By 1978, evidence revealed that
eighty-five percent of Indian children in foster care were placed in
non-Indian foster care homes and ninety percent of adopted Indian
children were adopted by non-Indian families. 12 By the 1970s, Indian
children faced a disproportionate risk of being placed in foster care or
adopted by persons of different ethnic backgrounds. As summarized
in a House Report on the ICWA, "The wholesale separation of Indian
children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive
aspect of American Indian life today."
13
The biggest concern with the high rate of removal of Indian chil-
dren from their homes was the devastating impact it could potentially
have on the future of the tribe. During the congressional hearings on
the ICWA, Calvin Issac, tribal chief of the Mississippi Band of Choc-
taw Indians, testified as follows:
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2000).
10. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 602 (2002).
11. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 821 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., Lexis-
Nexis 2005) (1941) (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978)) [hereinafter Co-
HEN'S]. Note that most of the evidence presented at the congressional hearings
was conducted by the Association of American Indian Affairs.
12. Jill E. Adams, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting Tribal Interest in
a Land of Individual Rights, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 301, 305 (1994); Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 33 (1989).
13. Id.
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Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our chil-
dren, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be
raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People.
Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes' ability to continue
as self-governing communities. Probably in no area is it more important that
tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally de-
terminative as family relationships.
1 4
Evidence presented at the congressional hearings pointed to ignorance
and hostility of state child social workers and judges towards Indian
cultures and beliefs.15 Particularly, "the failure of non-Indian social
workers to understand the role of the extended family in Indian soci-
ety" concerned tribal authorities.1 6 State social workers might view a
child as abandoned-grounds for terminating the parental rights-if
the child is placed with persons outside the nuclear family. But, In-
dian culture considers all members of the tribe as "family" to care for
the child and would claim that an Indian child can never in fact be
"abandoned."17
Through the creation of the ICWA, Congress hoped to impart the
importance of sensitivity to tribal culture on state social agencies
when rendering child welfare decisions and also to respect tribal sov-
ereignty. The ICWA declares that "there is no resource that is more
vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than
their children."l8 The ICWA states further that its purpose is
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and
the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect
the unique values of Indian culture .... 19
To protect both Indian families and the future of the tribe, the ICWA
was designed to regulate proceedings for the termination of parental
rights, adoptions, and foster care placement of Indian children. 20 The
ICWA is unique in that it places federal and tribal law into family law
14. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
95th Cong. 193 (1978) (statement of Calvin Isaac, tribal chief of the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians). See also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1989) (It was noted in the House Report that "[an Indian
child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are
counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers, untu-
tored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially irresponsi-
ble, consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect
and thus as grounds for terminating parental rights.") Id.
15. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34-35.
16. Id. at 35 & n.4.
17. Id.
18. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
19. Id. § 1902.
20. See Id. § 1903.
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which is traditionally an area reserved for the state governments. 2 1
The overriding goal of protecting, preserving, and advancing the integ-
rity of America's Indian tribes is promoted by the ICWA through provi-
sions relating to (1) jurisdiction and tribal participation in child
custody proceedings, 2 2 (2) heightened standards for foster care place-
ment and for termination of parental rights,23 (3) preferences for
placement of American Indian children,24 and (4) support of American
Indian children and family programs. 25
The statutory provisions of the ICWA operate under the assump-
tion that keeping Indian children within their native community is
not only in the best interest of the child, but also compatible with the
goal of protecting and promoting tribal integrity. 26 As one court has
stated, "The Act is based on the assumption that protection of the In-
dian child's relationship to the tribe is in the child's best interest."
27
Evidence has shown that Indian children placed in non-American In-
dian homes have serious adjustment problems and struggle to cope in
white society despite being raised in a purely white environment with-
out exposure to any of their cultural identity.28 In contrast, Indian
children who grow up within their native tribe are exposed to the
tribe's language, culture, economic activity, and the values and activi-
ties that constitute the tribe's distinct way of life.29 New generations
of Indian children make it possible for the Indian tribes and families
to maintain their survival as a unique tribe and self-governing com-
munity.3 0 The ICWA, while designed to keep Indian families intact, is
subject to the overarching goal of promoting "the stability and security
of Indian tribes."3 1
B. The Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act
The high number of Indian child removals which plagued the coun-
try during the 1960s and 1970s could also be found within the State of
Nebraska. Statistics showed that within Nebraska, one of every nine
Indian children was removed from his or her parents or guardians and
21. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 820.
22. Adams, supra note 12, at 306-07; 25 U.S.C. § 1903-04 (2000).
23. Adams, supra note 12; 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-(f).
24. Adams, supra note 12; 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
25. Adams, supra note 12.
26. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 823. See also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,37 (1989) (explaining that the ICWA purports to protect
the rights of Indian children and the Indian tribe by keeping Indian children
within the Indian community).
27. Chester County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912, 914 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (internal citation omitted).
28. Holyfield, 409 U.S. at 33.
29. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 824.
30. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 834.
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000).
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placed, overwhelmingly, in a non-Indian home in the years preceding
the enactment of the ICWA.32 In contrast, during the same time pe-
riod, only one in fifty-five white children in Nebraska were removed
from their homes. 33 None of the white children removed from their
natural homes were placed in homes of a different racial identity.
34
Most states incorporated the federal ICWA into their jurisprudence
through judicial interpretation. Nebraska is one of the few states to
incorporate the Act through its own statutory version in 1985.35 The
Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act ("NICWA" or "Nebraska Act")
states that its purpose "is to clarify state policies and procedures re-
garding the implementation by the State of Nebraska of the [F]ederal
Indian Child Welfare Act."3 6 The Nebraska Act is unique in that it
states that "[ilt shall be the policy of the state to cooperate fully with
Indian tribes in Nebraska in order to ensure that the intent and provi-
sions of the [Flederal Indian Child Welfare Act are enforced."3 7 Other
than this policy statement, the NICWA is identical to the federal
statute.
C. The Collectivist Goals of the NICWA
The NICWA was designed "to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes."38 To achieve this goal, Congress looked to Indian chil-
dren to continue the legacy of America's Indian tribes. The provision
of the NICWA at issue in Phoenix was the increased burden of proof
required before parental rights to an Indian child can be terminated.
This provision was designed not only to keep the Indian family to-
gether, but also, perhaps more importantly, keep Indian children
within the tribal culture.
To protect the existence and future of America's Indians, the ICWA
makes no secret that it is willing to place the interests of the tribal
community above the individual interests of parents of American In-
dian children. 39 When the ICWA was introduced as legislation, House
Representative Morris Udall of Arizona emphasized the tribal inter-
ests sought to be protected by the ICWA when he asked, "What re-
source is more critical to an Indian tribe than its children? What is
more vital to the tribes' future than its children?"40
32. Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, a
Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 663 (1994).
33. Id. at 664.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 669.
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1502 (Reissue 2005).
37. Id.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000).
39. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50 (1989).
40. Adams, supra note 12, at 312 (internal citation omitted).
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While family law regulates the "collective family" unit, the lan-
guage which the courts use to discuss issues is in the form of individ-
ual and not collective rights.4 1 The ICWA is recognition by the United
States government of the collectivist nature that is dominant in Na-
tive American culture; through the Act, the government holds the col-
lective interest to protect the continued existence Indian tribes as
more important than the individual rights of Indian parents. 4 2 This is
perhaps the most controversial aspect of the ICWA-it is a federal law
which holds the collective interests of the tribe above individual pa-
rental rights. The provisions of the ICWA are designed to keep Indian
children, if not within their family, at least within the child's tribe.
This is accomplished through several procedural safeguards within
the ICWA, found in Title 25 of the United States Code:
§ 1911(a) grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over any Indian child
custody proceeding who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such
tribe;
4 3
§ 19 11(b) requires a transfer of custody proceedings for an Indian child who is
not domiciled on the reservation in absence of good cause to the contrary;
4 4
§ 1911(c) allows the American Indian child's tribe the right to intervene at any
point in state court proceedings concerning foster care placement or termina-
tion of parental rights;
4 5
§ 1912(a) requires the notification of the Indian child's tribe of any involun-
tary proceedings concerning an Indian child;
4 6
§ 1915 provides for preferences for placement of Indian children when they
are removed from their natural home and placed into foster care or adoptive
care. Note that all of the preferences involve either an extended Indian family
member, a member of the Indian tribe, or any Indian family.
4 7
These provisions apply to all state court proceedings involving an In-
dian child who either (a) is a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligi-
ble for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.48 The underlying con-
nection between all of these provisions is that the child's tribe has the
ability to take an active role in custody proceedings and, ultimately, to
trump the decisions made by the child's parent(s).
D. Parental Rights and Non-Indian Children: In re Phoenix
In furthering the ultimate goal of keeping Indian children within
their tribal culture, one of the provisions of the NICWA establishes a
41. Adams, supra note 12, at 301.
42. Adams, supra note 12, at 301-03.
43. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
44. Id. § 1911(b).
45. Id. § 1911(c).
46. Id. § 1912(a).
47. Id. § 1915.
48. Id. § 1903.
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higher standard of proof before the parental rights to an Indian child
can be terminated. 49 By requiring a higher standard of proof for In-
dian children, the NICWA hopes to end the practice of removing In-
dian children from their homes simply because the Indian child's
home does not conform with non-Indians' stereotypes of the "correct"
family and home environment to raise a child.50 The increased bur-
den of proof allows Indian children to be raised by their natural par-
ents within tribal culture in order to pass down traditions for future
generations of Indians.
Section 43-1505(6) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, requires a
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the continued custody of the
Indian child by the parent or Indian custodian "is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child."51 In comparison,
section 43-279.01(3) only requires a showing by clear and convincing
evidence that a non-Indian child will be subject to further harm if
their natural parents or guardians retain custody.5 2 The higher bur-
den of proof required for Indian children should, in practice, result in
fewer parents of Indian children having their parental rights termi-
nated in situations where the rights of parents of non-Indian children
would be subject to termination.
In the 2006 case of In re Phoenix, Sonya, the mother of three non-
Indian children, brought an equal protection claim that the lower
standard of proof required for the termination of her parental rights
violated the Nebraska Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.
53
Sonya's parental rights to her three non-Indian children, Hunter, Jag-
ger, and Phoenix, had been terminated through two orders from the
Lancaster County juvenile court issued on March 30 and 31, 2005.54
With respect to Hunter and Jagger, Sonya was found by clear and con-
vincing evidence to have neglected her children, to have failed to cor-
rect home conditions which led to the adjudication of her parental
rights; indeed, her incapacities as a parent had led to the children be-
ing placed in out-of-home care for fifteen of the prior twenty-two
months.55 Sonya's parental rights to Phoenix were terminated after a
showing of clear and convincing evidence that Sonya had neglected
her.5 6
49. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1505(6) (Reissue 2005), with NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
279.01(3) (Reiusse 2005).
50. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 839.
51. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43- 1505(6) (Reissue 2005).
52. Id. § 43-279.01(3).
53. 270 Neb. 870, 708 N.W.2d 786 (2006).
54. Id. at 872, 708 N.W.2d at 790. Note that the two orders terminating Sonya's
parental rights, one concerning Hunter and Jagger, and the second concerning
Phoenix, were consolidated for appeal purposes.
55. Phoenix, 270 Neb. at 878, 708 N.W.2d at 794.
56. Id.
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Sonya appealed the termination orders, claiming that the clear-
and-convincing standard of proof required to terminate parental
rights to non-Indian children set forth in section 43-279.01(3), to
which Sonya was subject, violated her equal protection rights since
the standard of proof was less than what would have been required to
terminate her parental rights if the children had been Indians. 57
Sonya argued she was being racially discriminated against because,
as the mother of non-Indian children, her parental rights could be ter-
minated by a lower showing of evidence.58
The juvenile court of Lancaster County denied Sonya's equal pro-
tection claim, and Sonya appealed the issue to the Nebraska Supreme
Court in 2006. On appeal, Sonya claimed the juvenile court erred in
failing to find that section 43-279.01(3) violated her equal protection
rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion and article I, section 3, of the Nebraska Constitution.59 The Ne-
braska Constitution and the U.S. Constitution have identical
requirements for equal protection challenges, preventing the govern-
ment from treating differently persons who are, in all relevant as-
pects, alike. 60
The Court's initial inquiry into the equal protection claim was
whether Sonya, the mother of non-Indian children, was similarly situ-
ated to parents of Indian children. 6 1 Absent this baseline determina-
tion, Sonya lacked a viable equal protection claim. The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that, "as to the termination of parental rights leg-
islation at issue, the parents of non-Indian children are not similarly
situated to the parents of Indian children and, therefore, the parents
of non-Indian children lack a viable equal protection claim."6 2
The Court's decision was neither unexpected nor unfounded as the
Court had decades of U.S. Supreme Court precedent to guide its hold-
ing. At the core of the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision was the
determination that distinctions between Indian and non-Indian indi-
viduals are not based upon racial classification but are "attributable to
and [are] an incident of the historical sovereignty of Indian tribes."63
That Indian tribes are regarded by courts as individual sovereigns
within the borders of the United States is not a new concept. As first
discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1832 decision Worcester v.
Georgia, Indian tribes had been recognized by the United States as
57. Id. at 875, 708 N.W.2d at 792.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 878, 708 N.W.2d at 794.
60. Id. at 880-81, 708 N.W.2d at 795-96.
61. In re Phoenix L., 270 Neb. 870, 881, 708 N.W.2d 786, 796 (2006).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 882, 708 N.W.2d at 797.
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"distinct, independent political communities."64 Indian tribes are
qualified to exercise powers of self-government not because they had
been delegated power by the U.S. government, but rather through
their original tribal sovereignty which was not extinguished through
their inclusion within the United States.6 5 Indians lived within the
territorial boundaries of the United States before it was even a coun-
try. Through treaties and agreements, the various American Indian
tribes came within the jurisdiction of the United States.6 6 Yet, from
the beginning, the United States has allowed the tribal nations to
maintain power to regulate their internal and social structures. 6 7 The
power of Indian tribes to maintain a sovereign existence has not di-
minished nor abandoned through the passage of time or the assimila-
tion of the people into mainstream culture. Rather, it exists so long as
the federal government recognizes the sovereignty of each individual
Indian nation.6
8
The sovereignty of American Indian nations provides them with
the power to regulate their own internal governments, but they are
still subject to the overall, plenary power of the federal government.
69
For this reason, all Indians gain the protection of the U.S. Constitu-
tion to protect their fundamental liberties from governmental action.
This Note is specifically with the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment. The Ne-
braska case of In re Phoenix was not the first time that legislation
singling out Indians for different treatment had come before the
courts.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court had already faced an equal protec-
tion claim concerning American Indian classifications in the case
United States v. Antelope.7 0 In that case, members of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe were convicted of first-degree murder under the felony
murder provisions of the federal murder enclave statute which pro-
vided that any Indian which committed murder within Indian country
shall be subject to the same laws and provisions as other persons who
committed the same offense within the jurisdiction of the United
64. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
65. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 205.
66. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 206.
67. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 206.
68. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 206.
69. COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 206. Note that the U.S. Constitution mentions Indi-
ans in two places: the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and
the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from those defined as "free Persons" to be
counted in determining representation in the government and for tax purposes,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. These two references show that the founders recog-
nized the independence of the Indian nations but understood that United States
jurisdiction would still have to include power over the Indian tribes.
70. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
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States.7 ' The Indians challenged their convictions claiming racial dis-
crimination as the case would have been tried under the law of the
state in which the reservation was located if a non-Indian had commit-
ted the crime rather than under federal law.72 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, stated that the equal protection re-
quirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment had
not been violated for two reasons: (1) the federal statutes under which
the Indians were prosecuted were not based upon a racial classifica-
tion since the defendants were subject to the statutes not because of
their Indian blood but because they were enrolled members of the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe;73 and (2) that there was no equal protection
claim since any individual, regardless of ancestry or tribal enrollment,
would be subject to the same federal statute had they been charged
with murder within a federal enclave. 74 In similar fashion, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in Phoenix stated that federal laws which reg-
ulate Indian affairs are not based upon a racial classification, but
rather, are "rooted in the unique status of Indians as 'a separate peo-
ple' with their own political institutions." 7 5
In the Phoenix decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court went on to
quote the U.S. Supreme Court when it noted that the Court had previ-
ously upheld federal legislation singling out Indians for specific treat-
ment.7 6 In reality, had the U.S Supreme Court decided that such
legislation was an invidious racial classification and therefore uncon-
stitutional, an entire title of the United States Code would be ineffec-
tive "and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the
Indians would be jeopardized."77
71. Id. at 642-43 & n.1.
72. Id. at 643-44.
73. Id. at 646.
74. Id. at 648.
75. In re Phoenix L., 270 Neb.870, 883, 708 N.W.2d 786, 797 (2006) (quoting Ante-
lope, 430 U.S.at 646).
76. Id. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that the fed-
eral prosecution of a member of the Navajo Tribe was not in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment despite the fact that the mem-
ber had already been prosecuted under tribal law since the tribe was acting as an
independent sovereign and not as an arm of the federal government); United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (holding that the prosecution of members
of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe for a murder committed on an Indian reservation
under federal law was not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause since the
defendants were not subject to federal jurisdiction because they were of the In-
dian race but because they were enrolled members of the tribe and because the
murder had occurred within a federal enclave); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974) (holding that the employment preferences of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
which favored applicants of Indian ancestry for employment and promotions was
not considered contrary to the antidiscrimination provisions of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972).
77. Morton, 417 U.S. at 552.
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By the time that the Nebraska Supreme Court was confronted with
the equal protection claim in Phoenix, the issue had already been de-
cided. Sonya had no valid equal protection claim because she was not
similarly situated to the parents of Indian children. The standard of
proof in section 43-279.01(3) does not violate equal protection guaran-
tees of parents of non-Indian children since the classification of "In-
dian" is a political and not a racial classification.78 The higher
standard of proof required to terminate parental rights over Indian
children under the NICWA is based upon the nation's commitment to
continue the legacy of America's Indian tribes by reducing the number
of Indian children who are removed from their homes and tribes
through state court proceedings.79 Since the differing standards of
proof are based upon the historical sovereignty of the Indian tribes,
the termination of Sonya's parental rights to her three children was
affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court.8 0
III. ANALYSIS
The NICWA was challenged in Phoenix as allegedly violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Nebraska Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution because the Act treats parents of Indian children differ-
ently than parents of non-Indian children for the purpose of parental
rights termination proceedings. The decision of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court to deny the equal protection claim raised in Phoenix is
correct and indisputable since it is based upon the sovereignty of Na-
tive Americans. The U.S. Supreme Court has also opined that it is the
sovereignty of American Indians, and not their race, that allows Con-
gress to single out Indians for different treatment under the law with-
out violating the Equal Protection Clause.81
While it is clear that the NICWA can survive an equal protection
challenge from the parents of non-Indian children, Phoenix leaves
open the question of how the NICWA impacts parents of Indian chil-
dren. While all parental rights termination proceedings result in chil-
dren being permanently separated from their birth parents, parents of
Indian children, unlike parents not affected by the NICWA, have lim-
78. Phoenix, 270 Neb. at 882-84, 708 Neb. at 797.
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000).
80. Phoenix, 270 Neb. at 885, 708 N.W.2d at 798.
81. Morton, 417 U.S. 535. It is important to note the U.S. Bill of Rights does not
apply to Indians on the reservation and within tribal courts. Indians living on a
reservation receive civil liberties protection through the 1968 Indian Civil Rights
Act which adopts some, but not all of the provisions of the U.S. Bill of Rights. See
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2007). However, if an Indian appears in federal or state
court, they receive the full protection of the U.S. Bill of Rights. The analysis in
this Note focuses on the application of the ICWA in state and federal courts which
means that both the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause are appli-
cable to the analysis.
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ited abilities to determine the care, custody, and future permanent
home of their children.82 The immense restrictions placed upon par-
ents of Indian children on this issue potentially runs afoul of the Due
Process Clause. The Due Process Clause, as interpreted by the Court,
vests in all parents the fundamental liberty to make decisions con-
cerning the care, custody, religion, education, and future of their chil-
dren.8 3 The NICWA is designed in part to offer increased protection to
parents of Indian children by increasing the burden of proof required
before their parental rights can be terminated; however, the NICWA is
also designed to protect the collective interests of the Indian tribe.
8 4
These two goals arguably cannot co-exist without one of the interests
suffering. In the case of the NICWA, it is the private, parental rights
of the Indian parents which are sacrificed for the collective interests of
the tribe.
The analysis section of this Note is broken into two sections. Sec-
tion III.A demonstrates how the ICWA's primary goal of protecting the
integrity of Indian tribes results in encroachment of the rights of par-
ents of Indian children. Specifically, the ICWA limits a parent's abil-
ity to make decisions concerning the future of their children when
they voluntarily place their children up for adoption. Section III.B
puts forth the argument that the limitations placed upon parents of
Indian children by the ICWA infringes upon their fundamental paren-
tal rights protected by the Due Process Clause. Section III.B also pro-
vides commentary by the author which argues that the collective goal
of the Indian tribe, while a valid and important goal, should never be
placed above the fundamental rights each parent has to make deci-
sions concerning the future of their child.
A. Parental Rights under the ICWA
Historically, parental rights have been a class of rights that, while
not enumerated within the Constitution, have found basic protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Specifically, a parent's right to direct their children's educa-
tion and religion have been upheld as protectable interests by the
United States Supreme Court.8 5 A parent's right to establish a home
82. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 1901-63 (2000).
83. See infra note 85.
84. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
85. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish par-
ents to educate their children according to their religious beliefs); Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding an Oregon statute which prevented
parents from choosing to have their children educated in a private school uncon-
stitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that fundamental
parental rights prevent the state from denying children access to foreign lan-
guage instruction).
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and bring up children has been deemed "essential"8 6 and marriage
and procreation have been considered among the most "basic civil
rights of man."87 Part of a parent's right is to control the child's future
by placing him or her up for adoption. Parents of non-American In-
dian children maintain theses rights even as they are placing their
children up for adoption. For example, the New York Court of Appeals
upheld a New York statute which allowed parents who were placing
their children up for adoption to select the religion by which the child
would be raised.8 8
In contrast, the ICWA restricts the decisionmaking capabilities of
parents of Indian children who have chosen to place their child up for
adoption. Through the tribal notification and tribal intervention re-
quirements of the ICWA, along with preferences for placement of
American Indian children, parents of American Indian children find
themselves limited when it comes to making decisions regarding adop-
tion; parents of non-Indian children are not subject to the same limita-
tions.8 9 The ICWA has in fact created two categories of parents: those
who have children who are American Indian and those who do not.
Depending upon what class a parent falls into, their capability to
make decisions concerning the adoptive future of their child is differs
significantly.
Proceedings in which parents of American Indian children choose
to voluntarily terminate their rights to the children are one area
where the conflict between individual parental rights and collectivist
tribal rights may be the largest. If a parent of an American Indian
child subject to the ICWA decides to place her child up for adoption,
that parent, though voluntarily choosing adoption, must still comply
with the provisions of the ICWA. Voluntary termination proceedings
are first subject to issues of jurisdiction. A parent desiring confidenti-
ality may want to leave the reservation in order to place the child up
for adoption in state court proceedings rather than the tribal court.
However, the parent of an Indian child is unable to make such a deci-
sion since the ICWA gives jurisdiction to the tribal court, and the state
court, absent a showing of good cause, is required to move the proceed-
ings to tribal court. 90
86. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (internal citations omitted).
87. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
88. Dickens v. Ernesto, 281 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1972).
89. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (tribal intervention); § 1912(a) (tribal notification); § 1915
(preference for placement) (2000).
90. Id. § 1911. The tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children domi-
ciled on the reservation. If an Indian child not domiciled on the reservation, sec-
tion 19 11(b) requires that the child custody proceedings which have initially been
brought in state court be transferred to the tribal court absent a showing of good
cause.
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In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held the jurisdictional provisions of the ICWA directing
the voluntary termination proceedings to the tribal court must be en-
forced despite the wishes of the birth parents to have their twins
adopted by a family off of the reservation.9 1 The birth parents specifi-
cally chose to have their twins off the reservation in an attempt to
defeat the jurisdictional requirements of the ICWA out of fear that the
tribal court would require that their twins be placed in a home on the
reservation rather than with the non-Indian family the parents had
pre-selected to adopt their children.92 The U.S. Supreme Court stated
that the goal of the ICWA was to protect the integrity of the tribe;
thus, the tribe had a protectable interest in the Indian children which
trumped the interests of the birth parents. 9 3 The order of the state
court was terminated and the adoption proceedings moved to the tri-
bal court.94 Adoption proceedings that are governed by the ICWA are
unique as they are the only adoption proceedings where, pursuant to
federal law, the birth parent's wishes may be entirely overruled by the
tribe's interest in the children.
Voluntary termination proceedings also raise questions as to the
tribe's right to notice and to intervene in the adoption proceedings.
Often times, parents voluntarily placing their child up for adoption
wish to remain anonymous not only to their child but also their com-
munity. Yet, the provisions of the ICWA limit the ability of parents
of Indian children to successfully place their child up for voluntary
adoption while still remaining anonymous.95
The ICWA grants tribes the right to intervene in child custody pro-
ceedings involving an Indian child who is either a member of their
tribe or is eligible for membership, as is more often the case. 96 The
provision defining the tribe's right to intervene in child custody pro-
ceedings makes no distinction between involuntary child custody pro-
ceedings initiated by the state and voluntary proceedings initiated by
the child's parents. 9 7 This leaves open the question whether, in volun-
tary proceedings, the tribe has a right to intervene in order to have
their interests in the future of the Indian child represented in the
adoption proceedings. In contrast, the tribe's right to notice of child
custody proceedings is limited by the ICWA to notice only for involun-
91. 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989).
92. Id. at 40.
93. Id. at 49-51.
94. Id. at 53-54.
95. 25 U.S.C. § 1917. See Adams, supra note 12, at 333.
96. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c). In addition to the mandatory notice requirements for
involuntary termination proceedings, in any State court proceeding for the termi-
nation of parental rights to an Indian child, the Indian child's tribe has the right
to intervene at any point in the proceedings. Id. § 1911(c).
97. Id. § 1911(c).
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tary proceedings.98 The uncertainty raised by this apparent inconsis-
tency is, if the tribe has no right to notice in voluntary proceedings,
should that also mean that the tribe has no right to intervene in vol-
untary proceedings?9 9 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue,
to a degree, in a footnote of the Holyfield decision. 100 The Court im-
plied that since the ICWA gives the tribe the right to intervene in any
termination proceeding, the tribe has the right to intervene in a volun-
tary termination proceeding despite the fact there is no provision re-
quiring notice of the voluntary proceeding be given to the tribe. O1 In
effect, this means that despite the desire of the birth parent not to
have their tribe notified of or to be present at the termination proceed-
ing, the tribe has the right to intervene under the ICWA.102 There-
fore, if the tribe is made aware of custody proceedings involving an
Indian child, they have the ability to become a part of the proceedings
at any point in the proceeding and have their interests represented. 10 3
The tribe also has the ability to petition a state court to invalidate
any action which violates sections 1911, 1912, or 1913 of the ICWA.104
Thus, if a state court fails to notify the tribe of an involuntary parental
rights termination proceeding or if the state court fails to transfer a
child custody case to the tribal court when statute demanded that it
should, the tribe can independently appeal to have the decision of the
state court invalidated.10 5 The tribe's ability to petition to have state
decisions invalidated is most at issue in circumstances where the birth
mother of an Indian child wishes to remain anonymous and therefore,
does not notify anyone in her tribe that she is placing her child up for
adoption. While there is no statutory requirement that the state court
notify the tribe, the jurisdictional requirements might require that the
state court transfer the proceedings to the tribal court-in effect, com-
98. Id. § 1912(a).
99. For a general discussion on the ICWA's goal of protecting tribal interests see Ad-
ams, supra note 12 at 328-34.
100. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 38-39 n.12 (1989).
101. Adams, supra note 12, at 331-32. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 38-39 & n.12. The
ICWA defines "termination of parental rights" as "any action resulting in the ter-
mination of the parent-child relationship". 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii) (2000).
102. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (2000) (granting an Indian
child's tribe the right to intervene at any point in the proceeding).
103. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
104. Id. § 1914.
105. Id. Also note that another common issue involving the ICWA is that the state
court is not made aware the child subject to the proceedings is either an Indian
child or eligible for enrollment in a tribe. While that discussion is outside the
scope of this Note, § 1914 does not grant a tribe independent grounds to relitigate
a state court decisions based upon the jurisdictional requirements of § 1911 to
determine the custody of the child and the tribe is also estopped from relitigating
the custody issue. Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 298 (10th Cir. 1995).
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pletely overriding the birth mother's desires for confidentiality in
adoption proceedings.106
If the tribe has the right to become involved in any custody pro-
ceeding involving an Indian child of their tribe, the ability of birth
parents to make decisions, confidentially or otherwise, regarding their
child's future is restricted. With notification provisions and the juris-
dictional requirements that the custody proceedings take place within
the tribal courts, parents of Indian children find themselves denied
the right to make independent decisions involving the future of their
children; in essence, they share that power with the entire tribe. One
of the most important decisions in an adoption proceeding is the abil-
ity of the birth parent to chose the adoptive family of their child. Yet
the ICWA also limits the ability of parents of American Indian chil-
dren to make this decision.
The ICWA specifically states that an Indian child being removed
from his or her birth home should be placed with (a) an extended fam-
ily member, (b) an Indian family within the tribe, or (c) any Indian
family, in that order of preference. 10 7 The general phrase "adoptive
placement," as defined in the ICWA, applies to all "actions resulting in
a final decree of adoption."os Thus, the birth parents of an Indian
child are not only denied the right to choose a family off the reserva-
tion to raise their child, but also may face the possibility that their
child will be raised by an extended family member or a member of
their community.1 0 9
The potential for conflict between the confidential desires of the
biological parent and the tribal interests in an Indian child has prima-
rily been resolved in favor of the tribe.110 The Montana Supreme
Court has upheld a tribe's right to enforce the statutory preferences
for adoptive placement of an Indian child over the birth mother's stat-
utorily recognized interest in anonymity. 1 1 ' In In re Baby Girl Doe,
the birth mother specifically stated that she wished to remain anony-
mous and requested that her tribe not be notified. 1 12 The district
106. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(c) (2000). Note that this was exactly the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Holyfield. There the Court explicitly stated that the individual
wishes of the birth parents are trumped by the statutory goals of the ICWA.
107. Id. § 1915(a).
108. Id. § 1903(1)(iv) (emphasis added).
109. See id. § 1915(a).
110. While some courts have acknowledged that the ICWA may be an intrusion upon a
mother's decision to determine what is in the best interest of her child, the fed-
eral government's trust relationship with America's Indian tribes and Congress'
goal of preventing Indian children from being removed from their reservation
homes has proven to override the desires of biological parents. For a general
discussion on the government's commitment to protecting the integrity of the na-
tion's Indian tribes see COHEN'S, supra note 11, at 820-25.
111. In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090 (Mont. 1993).
112. Id. at 1091.
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court, on the premise that the mother's relinquishment of parental
rights was voluntary, chose to notify the tribe that there was a child
custody proceeding involving a child eligible for membership within
their tribe.113 The tribe intervened and requested that the statutory
placement provisions of the ICWA be enforced.114 The Montana Su-
preme Court, relying on Holyfield, denied the mother's request for an-
onymity, stating that the request could not be allowed to defeat the
ICWA's primary goal of promoting the stability and the future of the
Indian tribes by restricting the loss of their children to homes outside
the reservation.115
Through the placement preference provisions of the ICWA, there is
little hope that a biological parent of an Indian child will be able to
anonymously place that child up for voluntary adoption. While a par-
ent may desire to remain anonymous to their community, parents also
have the right to remain anonymous to their biological children which
are placed up for adoption. If, by some chance, the birth parents do
manage to have their Indian child placed according to the preferences
of the ICWA and still retain their anonymity, section 1917 of the ICWA
allows any Indian child who was subject to an adoption placement to
obtain information of their biological parent's tribal affiliation and
"such other information as may be necessary to protect any rights
flowing from the individual's tribal relationship."'l6 This may result
in such specific information being given to an adopted Indian child
that they are able to seek out their biological parents even though the
parents wish to remain anonymous.
The ICWA has created two classes of parents: those who have chil-
dren of Indian heritage and those who do not. While parents of non-
Indian children have the right to make decisions concerning the vol-
untary adoption of their child without interference by governmental
interests, the rights of parents of Indian children are severely limited.
The principal goal of the ICWA to "promote the stability and security
of Indian tribes by preventing the further loss of their children" comes
at the price of restricting the liberties of the parents of Indian chil-
dren."17 In enacting the ICWA, Congress has placed the collectivist
interest of the tribe above those of the individual liberties of parents of
Indian children. While the goal of continuing the traditions and cul-
tures of American Indian tribes is a vital goal and one that Congress
should be committed to, the price of such a goal is the violation of pa-
rental rights of Indian children which are protected under the Due
Process Clause.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1091-92.
115. Id. at 1093.
116. 25 U.S.C. § 1917 (2000).
117. In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Mont. 1993).
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B. Does the NICWA violate fundamental rights of parents of
Indian children?
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and its Fifth Amendment counter-
part, "guarantees more than fair process" and includes a substantive
component that "provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interest."118
The liberty interest potentially infringed upon by the NICWA is the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their Indian
children. Recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Gran-
ville as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recog-
nized by this Court," the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children has long been held to have a constitutional dimen-
sion. 119 A child is not "a mere creature of the State," and courts have
protected parental rights from excessive interference from the State
for decades when making decisions involving their children's
future.120
The statutory provisions of the NICWA are principally designed to
protect the integrity of the tribal community; as a result, parents of
Indian children find their parental rights suffering. By limiting the
rights of parents of Indian children to make decisions involving the
voluntary relinquishment of their parental rights, the NICWA argua-
bly runs afoul of the Due Process Clause's traditional protection of the
parental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children.12 1 In order to determine whether a due pro-
cess claim against the NICWA could succeed, there must first be a
"careful description" of the right asserted by the parents of Indian
children.122 Next, there must be a review of Supreme Court decisions
concerning various parental rights in order to ascertain exactly how
much protection a Nebraska court might give the specific right
claimed by parents of Indian children. Finally, the collective interests
of the tribe as promulgated in the NICWA must be weighed against
the individual parental rights of Indian parents.1
2 3
A parent's right to control the voluntary adoption proceeding of
their Indian children is based on the concept that parents have a rec-
118. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 65 (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
121. See supra note 85.
122. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
123. Note that in addition to the potential due process claim which is the focus of this
Note, there may also be a viable equal protection claim as well. That discussion
is outside the scope of this Note though, and if an equal protection claim were to
be brought, it could potentially be disposed of as quickly and with the same rea-
soning as was seen in Phoenix.
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ognized constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren. 12 4 While parents of Indian children may be asserting what is
generally classified as a "parental right," it is vital to have a careful
description of the asserted parental right so that a court can tailor its
analysis to the specific substantive due process right asserted. 125 In
this case, parental rights within the context of voluntary adoption pro-
ceedings are at issue. If the parent of an Indian child brought a sub-
stantive due process claim, it would need to be distinguished from
those cases which have defined parental rights in terms of involuntary
termination proceedings, which were at issue in In re Phoenix.
126
In order to maintain parental rights to a child, the Supreme Court
requires that parents fulfill some basic responsibilities. As seen in
Phoenix, if a parent fails to assume parental responsibilities, the state
permits a court to permanently terminate a biological or guardian par-
ent's rights.12 7 The mother in Phoenix raised an equal protection
claim and objected to the lower standard of proof required for the ter-
mination of her parental rights as opposed to the parent of an Indian
child. 128 By involuntarily terminating the mother's rights to her non-
Indian children, regardless of the standard of proof required, the state
has removed her right to make decisions involving the future of her
children because she has failed as a parent. Involuntary terminations
are founded in the parens patriae power of the state which obligates
state agencies and courts to look out for the children of the state.129
The due process claim that the parent of an Indian child would
have to bring is that he or she has not been irresponsible in the care of
the child and, therefore, should have the parental right to make deci-
sions concerning the future of the protected child despite the fact the
parent is terminating the relationship. While the decision the parent
would want protected is not based on the education or religion of the
child, it is a decision that the parent is not in a position to raise the
child, and as such, the parent wants to have the child voluntarily
placed for adoption.
In bringing a claim, the parent of an Indian child would have to
focus the allegations that he or she has been denied the parental right
124. See supra note 85.
125. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
126. See In re Phoenix L., 270 Neb. 870, 708 N.W.2d 786 (2006); Susan B.
Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 FAM. L.Q.
245 (1985).
127. Phoenix, 270 Neb. at 877-78, 708 N.W.2d at 793-94. Failure in parental respon-
sibilities can include abandonment, neglect, failure to fix home conditions, and
extended removal from the home. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-247 (Reissue 2005).
128. Phoenix, 270 Neb. at 872, 708 N.W.2d. at 790.
129. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-247(3). "Parens patriae" is defined as "the state re-
garded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those
unable to care for themselves." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
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to decide whether it is in the best interest of the child to be adopted by
a selected family off of the reservation.13 0 As seen in the preceding
section, parents of Indian children lack many of the basic protections
that parents of non-Indian children receive, including the ability to
place their child with the family of their preference, the ability to
chose state court versus their tribal court, and the ability to go
through the proceedings without notification of a third-party. 13 1 Par-
ents of Indian children would likely claim that their protected due pro-
cess right to make decisions concerning the upbringing of their
children is being violated by the provisions of the NICWA. The par-
ents' allegations would emphasize that their parental rights should
take priority over the tribe's interest in the proceedings and that the
tribe's ability to completely overrule choices made by parents goes too
far. 132
Some attention needs to be drawn to the fact that parents of Indian
children are voluntarily choosing to place their child up for adoption
and therefore voluntarily choosing to end their parental responsibili-
ties. Following this line of thought, should parents who are volunta-
rily choosing to place their child for adoption have restricted rights or
similar due process protection as parents subject to involuntary termi-
nations? It appears that courts in non-ICWA cases are willing to pro-
tect parental decisionmaking capabilities even as those parental
rights are being terminated. For example, the New York Court of Ap-
peals upheld a statute which gives parents the right to choose their
child's religion when placing him or her up for adoption, and the Utah
Court of Appeals upheld a mother's decision to place her child with a
stranger rather than the child's grandmother.13 3 It is also important
to note that in involuntary proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court has
clearly stated that procedures to terminate parental rights must meet
due process requirements. 134 Voluntary proceedings which terminate
parental rights should also be protected by due process requirements;
similarly, the parents of Indian children should have their right to
make decisions protected.
130. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 697-98 (N.D.
Tex. 2000).
131. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
132. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
133. Dickens v. Ernesto, 281 N.E.2d 153, (N.Y. 1972) (upholding a statute which al-
lowed parents to express a preference that their child be raised in the religion of
their choice, even though they were giving the child up for adoption); Kasper v.
Nordfelt, 815 P.2d 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the mother's choice to
place her child with an adoption agency should not be disregarded simply because
the paternal grandparents want to raise the child). See supra section III.A.
134. See infra note 157.
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The next issue in the due process analysis is what level of protec-
tion a Nebraska court could offer parents of Indian children based
upon how the courts have classified parental rights.135 Recently, the
U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have left open the ques-
tion as to whether parental rights should, in every or under any cir-
cumstance, be considered fundamental and receive the highest level of
protection from the court.
13 6
The foundation of parental rights is the Meyer/Pierce /Yoder tril-
ogy-three historical cases which are considered the touchstone for
parental rights receiving substantive due process protection. 13 7 While
these cases lay the foundation for parental rights, it is important to
note that these decisions were based upon parental right claims chal-
lenging states statues concerning public education, an interest that is
very different than the parental right at interest here.
The Meyer v. Nebraska decision laid the foundation for the Su-
preme Court's protection of the right of parents to direct the upbring-
ing and education of their children. In that case, a teacher who gave
student lessons in the German language was prosecuted under a Ne-
braska law prohibiting educational instruction to children in any lan-
guage other than English. 138 While it was the teacher who was in
violation of Nebraska law, the parents expressly requested that the
lessons be taught to their children in German, which implicated their
parental right to make educational choices for their children.13 9 The
Court found that parents' liberty interest in the upbringing and edu-
cation of their children was within the parameters of rights protected
by the Due Process Clause. 140
Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held a state
statute prohibiting parents from sending their children to private
schools unconstitutional.141 Expressly relying upon their decision in
Meyer, the Court held that the statute "unreasonably interfere [d] with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and edu-
135. See infra note 156.
136. For a discussion of parental rights see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000);
Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 697-703 (N.D. Texas
2000).
137. Littlefield, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 697-98. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (upholding the right of Amish parents' to educate their children according
to their religious beliefs); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
as unconstitutional an Oregon statute which prevented parents from choosing to
have their children educated in a private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (holding that fundamental parental rights prevent the state from de-
nying children access to foreign language instruction).
138. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923).
139. Id. at 400.
140. Id. at 399-400.
141. 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925).
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cation of children under their control."14 2 In Yoder v. Wisconsin, par-
ents of Amish children challenged a Wisconsin statute requiring all
children to attend school until the age of sixteen. 143 The parents chal-
lenged the statute based on their religious belief that their children
should not be required to attend school past the eighth grade. 14 4 In
holding that the Amish children were not required to attend school for
the statutory period, the Court reaffirmed that parental rights are a
protected liberty interest.145 Other courts have noted that Yoder "rec-
ognized the 'high responsibility' and regulatory power of the state in
matters of public education," which implies that the state's power to
regulate public education is also a highly protected right of the state
and should not automatically be pushed aside in favor of the right of
parental choice.
14 6
While all three of these foundational cases expressly note that par-
ents have a constitutionally protected right to make decisions involv-
ing the upbringing of their children, all three cases applied rational
basis review based on the parents' secular assertion of parental rights
under the Due Process Clause.14 7 The Court in Yoder clearly pre-
mised its holding in part on the "interests of parenthood" but other
courts have expressly noted that "the secular aspect of [a] claim (im-
plicating due process) will not overcome a reasonable educational reg-
ulation."148 This implies that in order to achieve strict scrutiny
analysis, there will likely have to be a religious-based challenge to
statutes infringing upon parental rights concerning the education of
children.
Thus, it appears that the parental right's foundation of the Meyer /
Pierce/Yoder trilogy may only hold that the Due Process interest of
parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children,
standing alone, warrants no more than rational basis review. These
three cases have two important implications for a parent challenging
the NICWA. First, the cases establish that while parental rights may
receive constitutional protection, in order to receive strict scrutiny
analysis, a parent's claim against a state statute may necessitate a
First Amendment element. Secondly, since these cases involve paren-
142. Id. at 534-35.
143. 406 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1972).
144. Id. at 214.
145. Id. at 235-36.
146. Littlefield Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 699 (N.D. Texas 2000).
147. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("A way of life ... may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considera-
tions . . . ."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923)); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (the interference by the state must not be
"arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the state to effect."). Id. at 400.
148. Littlefield, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 699.
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tal rights within the educational field, it might be that Meyer, Pierce,
and Yoder fail to help establish a due process challenge to the
NICWA. If a Nebraska court were to use these cases as the defining
precedent, then that may spell disaster for a parent's claim since a
challenge of the NICWA would likely be secular in nature and receive
only rational basis scrutiny, which would likely result in the parent's
claim being defeated.
Fortunately for parents of Indian children, parental rights and the
Meyer/Pierce/Yoder line of cases have recently been addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the context of custody and visitation rights,
which are situations that would be much more applicable to a chal-
lenge of the NICWA. In Troxel v. Granville, the mother of two minor
children challenged a Washington state visitation statute which per-
mitted "[any person" to petition a court for visitation rights and em-
powered courts to grant visitation whenever it "may serve the best
interest of the child."149 In holding the statute unconstitutional, the
four justice plurality that expressly referred to parental rights as fun-
damental stated that the Washington statute interfered with the
mother's "fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concern-
ing the rearing of her own daughters."15o In his concurrence, Justice
Thomas stated that he agreed with the plurality in their "recognition
of a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren," but he also noted that the opinion of the plurality, along with
Justice Souter's concurrence and Justice Kennedy's dissent, fails to
articulate the appropriate standard of review. 151 Thus, in Troxel, the
Court expressed a majority opinion that parental rights in the context
of visitation and custody are considered fundamental but left open the
issue of whether the Court's fundamental language was meant to im-
ply a strict scrutiny analysis.15 2
149. 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
150. Id. at 70. The plurality was written by Justice O'Connor and included Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 60.
151. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). The plurality along with Justice Thomas' con-
currence in Troxel results in five Justices stating that parental rights under the
Due Process Clause are considered fundamental. Justice Souter, concurring,
stated that the Washington statute simply sweeps too broadly in whom and
under what circumstances the statute allows non-biological individuals to have
visitation rights. Souter further states that "[clonsequently, there is no need to
decide whether harm is required or to consider the precise scope of the parent's
right or its necessary protections." Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Ste-
vens, in dissent, makes no argument that parents lack a fundamental liberty
interest in determining the care an upbringing of their children. However, Ste-
vens feels that this liberty interest is neither absolute nor without boundaries. Id.
at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, in dissent, stated that unenumer-
ated parental rights should receive very little stare decisis protection and also
asserted that parental rights are in no way absolute. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
152. Id. at 70 (majority opinion).
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The sweeping statement by the plurality-that parental rights are
a "fundamental" liberty interest-was a point of concern for other
members of the Court as it implied that parental rights should receive
strict scrutiny. In his concurrence, Justice Souter stated that while
the Court has "long recognized that a parent's interest in the nurture,
upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are gener-
ally protected by the Due Process Clause," the court has never fully
defined the scope of parental rights which will receive constitutional
protection.153
Justice Stevens, in dissent, also criticized the plurality's broad pro-
tection of parental rights and remarked that a parent's interest in car-
ing for and guiding their children may be encroached upon by state
action in "exceptional circumstances."154 In a separate dissent, Jus-
tice Kennedy stated that the Meyer/Pierce /Yoder cases which the
Court had based their fundamental language upon all articulated a
broad fundamental parental right but that the right had been nar-
rowly applied to the specific circumstances of each case. The com-
plete diversity between the claims presented in those cases made
them, in Justice Kennedy's opinion, poor precedent for the visitation
issue presented in Troxel.15 5
Not to be left out of the parental rights discussion is the U.S. Su-
preme Court's review of parental rights in the context of terminating
parental rights. Unfortunately, most of the discussion has focused on
involuntary termination of parental rights. In Santosky v. Kramer,
the U.S. Supreme Court established a constitutional requirement that
a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a biological
parent's continued custody will result in emotional or physical harm
to the child before a parent's rights can be terminated.156 While not
discussing voluntary termination, the Court affirmed that state inter-
vention to terminate a parent-child relationship must satisfy the re-
quirements of due process. 157  Besides acknowledging that
proceedings terminating parental rights require due process protec-
tion, the Court's majority opinion, without qualification, boldly states
that the Court has historically recognized that "freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment."158
Considering the decades of parental rights precedent and the rela-
tively recent discussion of parental rights in both Santosky and Troxel,
153. Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 95-96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156. 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982).
157. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 37
(1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
158. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (internal citations omitted).
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what level of protection could a Nebraska court offer the parent of an
Indian child against infringement of their constitutional rights by the
NICWA? Ultimately, it would appear that the U.S. Supreme Court's
classification of parental rights as "fundamental" would require that a
Nebraska court apply strict scrutiny analysis to the NICWA if it were
to be challenged by parents of Indian children as violating their rights
protected by the Due Process Clause.
Even if a Nebraska court afforded fundamental protection to a
claim by parents of Indian children against the NICWA, there is obvi-
ously some discourse between members of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Troxel make evident that
some Justices would allow parental rights to be abridged if there is a
sufficient state interest. 159 If strict scrutiny analysis was applied to a
claim by the parent of an Indian child, the challenged provisions of the
NICWA may not be struck down if the state can show that the NICWA
is designed to achieve a compelling goal and that its statutory provi-
sions are the least restrictive means to achieve that goal.160 As out-
lined in Part II, the NICWA is designed to protect not only the best
interest of the Indian children by reducing the number of Indian chil-
dren who are removed from their tribal homes, but also to "promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families."
16 1
The high percentage of Indian children who were removed and
placed in non-Indian homes through state court proceedings during
the 1960s and 1970s caused alarm among the Indian community. 162
The Indian nations feared that continued removals would result in a
complete depletion of tribal children, resulting in the tribes' inability
to carry on their traditions and culture. Relying upon the trust rela-
tionship between the sovereign Indian tribes and the federal govern-
ment, Congress enacted the ICWA explicitly for the purpose of
protecting the integrity of the Indian tribes through procedures de-
signed to keep Indian children on the reservation.163 While some of
these provisions are directed at the parent-child relationship, others
159. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
160. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding the right to marry as funda-
mental and striking down a statute which prevented non-custodial parents, who
were behind in child support, from marrying); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (holding Virginia's miscegenation laws to strict scrutiny analysis after de-
claring the right to marry fundamental); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (applying strict scrutiny analysis to a doctor's challenge to a Connecticut
provisions which prevented married couples from using contraception).
161. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1502 (stating that the purpose of
the NICWA "is to clarify state policies and procedures regarding the implementa-
tion by the State of Nebraska of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act").
162. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
163. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
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are directed at the child-tribe relationship.164 For the most part, it is
the child-tribe provisions that potentially invade the rights of parents
of Indian children to make decisions in voluntary adoption
proceedings.
Almost thirty years ago, Congress concluded that the ICWA was
necessary to protect the future of Indian tribes. Today, if the parent of
an Indian child would challenge the NICWA, key among the court's
assessment would be whether the NICWA is still necessary to protect
the future Indian tribes and whether that protection validates the po-
tential infringement upon the rights of parents of Indian children
through application of the NICWA. Current statistics tracking the
number of Indian children that were removed from their homes and
placed in non-Indian homes since the enactment of the NICWA would
be a good start in this analysis; unfortunately, no group has current
statistics on how many Indian children are being taken from their res-
ervation home and placed in non-Indian homes.16 5 Without these sta-
tistics, it is difficult to determine whether the policy goals of the
NICWA have resulted in reducing the number of children removed
from the tribes and whether all provisions of the NICWA are still
necessary.
In addition to Indian child adoption statistics, courts should also
remember that America's Indian tribes control the ability to deter-
mine their own tribal membership requirements. 166 As a result,
tribes have the ability to include or exclude individuals, which directly
impacts the number of individuals who could potentially identify
themselves as members of an Indian tribe. Tribes are not powerless to
protect their community against state government and may adjust
their tribal membership requirements when they feel threatened with
extinction. However, with the prosperity of tribal casinos, some tribes
are finding membership overloads and are restricting membership. 1
6 7
All of these issues would be central to the analysis of current tribal
integrity and the need for federal protection of Indian tribes and any
Nebraska court faced with a parental challenge to the NICWA would
164. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (requiring a showing of evidence beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the parents continued custody of the Indian child will result in
emotional and/or physical harm to the child), with § 1912(a) (requiring that no-
tice be sent to the child's tribe if there is a state court proceeding involving the
termination of parental rights involving a child that is either a member of an
Indian tribe of eligible for membership).
165. See supra note 32.
166. U.S. Department of the Interior, Indian Ancestry - Enrollment in a Federally
Recognized Tribe, http://www.doi.gov/enrollment.html (last visited September 2,
2007).
167. Ted Hillock, Injustice on the Reservation, CALIFORNIAN, March 31, 2004, at B4,
available at http://www.nctimes.comlarticles/2004/04/O1/opinion/3-31_0422-1-
44.txt.
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have to consider. These issues also highlight that the status of many
Indian tribes may have changed since the enactment of the NICWA
and specific provisions, especially those involving voluntary termina-
tion proceedings, may need to be reconsidered in light of such changes.
Despite all these policy considerations, it must be emphasized that
the government's interest in preserving Indian tribes does not extin-
guish the potential violation of the rights of parents of Indian children
to make many decisions concerning the upbringing of their children.
While it is questionable whether a challenge to the NICWA would suc-
ceed, the parents of Indian children clearly have a protected liberty
interest in making decisions concerning the future and upbringing of
their children.16 8 As the foregoing analysis concluded, current paren-
tal rights law should allow parents of Indian children to bring a due
process challenge against the NICWA. Strict scrutiny analysis of the
NICWA would require a compelling state interest in maintaining the
current provisions of the NICWA despite the fact that they may violate
parental rights to Indian children.169 The success of a parent's chal-
lenge will be greatly influenced by whether the governmental inter-
ests that prompted the enactment of the NICWA in 1978 are still
viable reasons for the continuation of America's policy in protecting
tribal integrity.
The NICWA clearly appears to infringe upon the right of parents of
Indian children to make decisions concerning the voluntary termina-
tion of their parental rights, and, despite their tribal membership,
parents of Indian children must receive the same constitutional pro-
tection as all other parents. Therefore, the question is whether the
collectivist interests of Indian tribes are compelling enough to justify
the continued violation of the rights of parents of Indian children.
IV. CONCLUSION
Parental rights have received constitutional protection since the
1923 landmark case Meyer v. Nebraska.170 While all parents have a
right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children, this right can be taken away if a parent fails to respon-
sibly care for their children. In the 2006 case In re Phoenix, the
mother of three non-Indian children had the decision of the juvenile
court terminating her parental rights affirmed by the Nebraska Su-
preme Court after a finding of clear and convincing evidence that con-
tinued custody with the mother would result in emotional and
168. See supra section III.A.
169. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
170. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1972) (holding that fundamental parental
rights prevent the state from denying children access to foreign language instruc-
tion despite the demands of their parents).
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physical harm to the children. 17 1 The mother claimed that her right
to equal protection under the law was violated as her parental rights
could be terminated by a lower showing of evidence than parents of
Indian children pursuant to the provisions of the NICWA. While the
Nebraska Supreme Court was able to deny the equal protection claim
based upon the historic sovereignty of Indians, the case leaves open
the question of how the NICWA impacts parents of Indian children.
Careful analysis of the NICWA makes it obvious that parents of
Indian children lack the ability to make many decisions concerning
the control and upbringing of their children. This is especially evident
in the restrictions faced by parents of Indian children when volunta-
rily placing their children up for adoption. The provisions of the
NICWA which restrict the rights of parents of Indian child arguably
run afoul of the Due Process Clause's protection of parental rights.
If a parent of an Indian child were to challenge the provisions of
the NICWA as unconstitutional, the first questions concern whether
the parental right asserted is considered fundamental and the level of
scrutiny the court should use to evaluate the right. The precedent set
forth in Troxel and Santosky would appear to classify the right
claimed by a parent of an Indian child as fundamental; accordingly,
strict scrutiny analysis would apply.172 The next question is whether
the overarching NICWA goals of protecting the integrity and future of
the tribe would be a compelling interest and override the rights of the
parents to make decisions concerning the involuntary adoption of
their Indian child.
Regardless of the outcome, the provisions of the NICWA definitely
infringe upon the rights of parents of Indian children. While the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has already ruled against a non-Indian par-
ent's challenge to the NICWA in Phoenix, this should not discourage
parents of Indian children from challenging the NICWA as a violation
of their due process rights. While the NICWA may serve the impor-
tant goal of protecting Nebraska's Indian tribes, the survival of the
tribe cannot come at the price of violating the personal rights of the
parents of Indian children.
Katherine S. Vogel
171. 270 Neb. at 885, 708 N.W.2d at 798.
172. See supra section III.B.
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